Writz Protocol - Testnet Deployments

Network: Soroban Testnet (Test SDF Network ; September 2015) Deployer: writz-deployer

Current deployment (2026-08-19)

Redeployed all four contracts together after the Elliot code-quality pass: is_borrow soundness fix + collateral/price range checks in the ZK circuits (new verification keys, since the constraint system changed), the Config.paused flag, the set_spv_contract/set_zk_verifier/set_oracle setters, supply/withdraw events, and the oracle-stub dedup into spv-types, per docs/architecture/contract-migration-runbook.md § Track 1 (planned migration, no funds at risk on the superseded testnet contracts - straight redeploy rather than a wind-down). Built via stellar contract build (wasm-opt applied). Per the immutability ADR (docs/architecture/adr/0001-contract-immutability.md) there is no in-place upgrade path, so this is four fresh Contract IDs, not an upgrade of the ones below.

bitcoin-spv

Field	Value
Contract ID	`CB2BD6QCSZVNZN5NLI7C5NF356WXVJDSXT6LVAQFWHHS4SZ4NCKKNIVA`
WASM Hash	`5b9de530d01873fa78baf03f6064321b5ce68742eff6ce0be34bcabe6846e3ff`
WASM Size	12,030 bytes
Deploy tx	`67377456f5...`
Initialize tx	`bf8279224e...`
set_checkpoint tx	`d5fb18330e...`
Deployed	2026-08-19

Checkpoint anchored to Bitcoin Signet tip at deploy time:

Field	Value
`height`	`318363`
`block_hash` (internal order)	`66a086bdd1ad395d75bec65805ecc1734b8c8a7f9bb62ca0304d3f560f000000`
`bits`	`0x1d146a9f` (`487877279`)

Verified: get_checkpoint reads back exactly these values. ✓ The checkpoint must be refreshed periodically (recommended: weekly) - see docs/security/security-model.md for the full trust-model discussion. Before mainnet, convert the admin account to a multisig (2-of-3) rather than a single key.

zk-verifier

Field	Value
Contract ID	`CBNZU23QGCZATJB2QMNF2K6IST2SVP7FSGCKASQNBULTWDWGANDBYLFY`
WASM Hash	`2fc6bcc24c8bb4f6a0646d2fd3fd9aee8a1126f39b593dba9745ad41d7a06f88`
WASM Size	14,498 bytes
Deploy tx	`be52af6018...`
Admin	`GB2BSYQS3FRJ5LZSSIDF3ZCSG5MKWJT5SZ3OZO4QRCAMCR357YAVPTWT` (`writz-deployer`)
Deployed	2026-08-19

Verification keys set (regenerated from the range-checked circuits - IC lengths unchanged, but the key material itself differs from the superseded deployment since the constraint system changed):

Circuit	IC length	Set tx
Deposit	6	`81bb495360...`
BorrowRepay	9	`ff1f320b5c...`
Liquidation	6	`5d4c843f73...`

Verified: get_verification_key --circuit BorrowRepay reads back IC length 9 with all four curve-point fields populated. ✓

Note: These keys are from the development trusted setup (pot15). They are for testnet only and will be replaced by the multi-party ceremony keys before mainnet.

commitment-tree

Field	Value
Contract ID	`CDQCTFO3FK3M47QS47O2A4WLNPSQAQBSXBFPJ6RZEHFO5D7RY34FSBBP`
WASM Hash	`1acf95d04afb85c98f88b844e1b9eabbfa60965728e084e533b057e754896097`
WASM Size	31,692 bytes
Deploy tx	`4e88f6a592...`
Init tx	`0e71dc8304...`
Deployed	2026-08-19
Interface	Adds `Config.paused` + `set_paused`, `set_spv_contract`, `set_zk_verifier`, `set_oracle`, `supply`/`withdraw` events (Tyler architecture pass, #26-adjacent) on top of the existing `enc_note` interface (#18)

Configuration

Parameter	Value
`admin`	`GB2BSYQS3FRJ5LZSSIDF3ZCSG5MKWJT5SZ3OZO4QRCAMCR357YAVPTWT` (`writz-deployer`)
`spv_contract`	`CB2BD6QCSZVNZN5NLI7C5NF356WXVJDSXT6LVAQFWHHS4SZ4NCKKNIVA`
`zk_verifier`	`CBNZU23QGCZATJB2QMNF2K6IST2SVP7FSGCKASQNBULTWDWGANDBYLFY`
`usdc_token`	`CBIELTK6YBZJU5UP2WWQEUCYKLPU6AUNZ2BQ4WWFEIE3USCIHMXQDAMA` (testnet USDC SAC - `USDC:GBBD47IF…`, DEX-liquid, 7 decimals)
`oracle`	`GB2BSYQS3FRJ5LZSSIDF3ZCSG5MKWJT5SZ3OZO4QRCAMCR357YAVPTWT` (stub - `writz-deployer`)
`min_confirmations`	`1` (testnet)

Verified: get_merkle_root → "2134e76ac5d21aab186c2be1dd8f84ee880a1e46eaf712f9d371b6df22191f3e", matching the Poseidon-2 empty Merkle tree root at depth 20. ✓ Pool seeded: 500 USDC supplied by writz-deployer - 5241a90817.... get_pool_state → total_supplied: 5,000,000,000 stroops (500 USDC), total_borrowed: 0. ✓

private-lend

Field	Value
Contract ID	`CAAWVMDRUPEJNELSQ6RU2VMVX5EJLQ2E77T7IXDWGMW4DGSNAGECGSWR`
WASM Hash	`fcd672a16cb62393b7c24965c817076df0d219c402b8d8219f9ebf6fff7c9e0d`
WASM Size	36,005 bytes
Deploy tx	`0438ac105b...`
Init tx	`1e18318538...`
Deployed	2026-08-19
Interface	Adds `Config.paused` + `set_paused`, `set_keeper`, `set_keeper_stale_window`, `set_relayer`, `set_oracle`, `set_spv_contract`, keeper stale-window liquidation fallback, `supply`/`withdraw` events

Configuration

Parameter	Value
`admin`	`GB2BSYQS3FRJ5LZSSIDF3ZCSG5MKWJT5SZ3OZO4QRCAMCR357YAVPTWT` (`writz-deployer`)
`spv_contract`	`CB2BD6QCSZVNZN5NLI7C5NF356WXVJDSXT6LVAQFWHHS4SZ4NCKKNIVA`
`usdc_token`	`CBIELTK6YBZJU5UP2WWQEUCYKLPU6AUNZ2BQ4WWFEIE3USCIHMXQDAMA`
`oracle`	`GB2BSYQS3FRJ5LZSSIDF3ZCSG5MKWJT5SZ3OZO4QRCAMCR357YAVPTWT` (stub - `writz-deployer`)
`keeper`	`GB2BSYQS3FRJ5LZSSIDF3ZCSG5MKWJT5SZ3OZO4QRCAMCR357YAVPTWT` (`writz-deployer` - no separate keeper bot running on testnet yet)
`relayer`	`GB2BSYQS3FRJ5LZSSIDF3ZCSG5MKWJT5SZ3OZO4QRCAMCR357YAVPTWT` (`writz-deployer` - same caveat)

Verified: get_protocol_state → total_supplied: 0, total_borrowed: 0, last_keeper_heartbeat set to init time. ✓ Pool seeded: 500 USDC supplied by writz-deployer - baf32ae36b.... get_protocol_state → total_supplied: 5,000,000,000 stroops (500 USDC). ✓

End-to-End ZK Flow Test ✓ (2026-08-19, against the current deployment)

Test instance: CCCT2CQUOMICS3IULYYQKCZ6PBUMUKE7EA77NQPDHHHVLUPLNOVQR2UU Token: XLM native SAC (CDLZFC3SYJYDZT7K67VZ75HPJVIEUVNIXF47ZG2FB2RMQQVU2HHGCYSC) Running scripts/deploy/e2e_zkflow.js against the new zk-verifier (CBNZU23Q…) surfaced a real gap: the script’s synthetic single-tx-block header had always used bits = 0/nonce = 0 (no actual mining), which the current bitcoin-spv correctly rejects with InsufficientProofOfWork - this only ever “worked” historically against a build that didn’t yet enforce real proof-of-work. Rather than weaken the shared production bitcoin-spv’s checkpoint (which is anchored to real Bitcoin Signet difficulty specifically to reject easy fake chains), the script now deploys its own throwaway bitcoin-spv per run with an easy checkpoint (EASY_TEST_BITS = 0x207fffff, same constant the Rust test suite uses) and mines its test header for real against it. Production bitcoin-spv’s security is unaffected.

Step	Transaction
bitcoin-spv (test) deploy + initialize	`9f0713766b…`
bitcoin-spv (test) set_checkpoint (easy)	`9829cc94ab…`
initialize (commitment-tree test instance)	`953e198668…`
supply_usdc (500 XLM)	`a2f0fa8db6…`
deposit (ZK proof ✓)	`9d749fdc08…`
insert_commitment	`4bc0a30a76…`
borrow 200 XLM (ZK proof ✓)	`33b50b0dc1…`
repay 200 XLM (ZK proof ✓)	`aa963eed8b…`

What this confirms: the freshly-generated borrow_repay verification key (with the is_borrow soundness fix + the new collateral/price range checks, both from the Elliot pass) correctly verifies real Groth16 proofs from the current circuits - deposit, borrow, and a full repay all passed on-chain against zk-verifier CBNZU23Q…. ✓

Follow-ups this redeploy did not do

Doc sweep: done - every non-historical reference to the superseded Contract IDs across docs/, README.md, docs.json, mint.json, relayer/README.md, and packages/commitment-tree/README.md now points at the current deployment; scripts/check-docs-sync.mjs reports zero drift. Test counts across all docs were re-synced from docs/_data/facts.json (191 contract tests + 60 bitcoin-script + 59 relayer + 29 circuits = 339 total) via scripts/update-test-counts.mjs.
Relayer live .env: no relayer instance’s real .env exists in this checkout (only .env.example, which had no hardcoded contract IDs to begin with) - nothing to update. If a deployed relayer instance exists elsewhere, its env needs the new COMMITMENT_TREE_ID/PRIVATE_LEND_ID by hand.
docs/developers/contract-reference.md and a couple of quick-start/milestone-plan snippets document function signatures and CLI calls (set_vkey, verify_groth16, commitment-tree/private-lend initialize argument lists, a bitcoin-spv::get_version call) that don’t match the actual current contract interfaces - this predates this redeploy and is a separate, larger doc-accuracy gap (API reference, not contract addresses). Contract IDs and test counts in those files are now correct; the signatures themselves were not rewritten here - flag if a full rewrite is wanted.

Superseded deployment (2026-06-22 / 2026-06-30)

Left running per the migration runbook’s default (no forced state transplant); kept here for history. No known funds are at risk on these - they predate real usage.

bitcoin-spv

Field	Value
Contract ID	`CAE5L7BO2GNF7MIZWXB2BTUMLYNIMQZUSWN2BWLZQS7HRHLOUSL6VLWJ`
WASM Hash	`cd7df01c483149dcde2db7921b51270329b980db0e8c605238dc2ce612bbe2e9`
WASM Size	5,225 bytes
Deploy tx	`8d2427337f...`
First invocation	`c9aacc05b2...`
Deployed	2026-06-22

Verified call

stellar contract invoke \
  --id CAE5L7BO2GNF7MIZWXB2BTUMLYNIMQZUSWN2BWLZQS7HRHLOUSL6VLWJ \
  --source writz-deployer \
  --network testnet \
  --send=yes \
  -- \
  verify_transaction \
  --headers '["010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e5d196bfb21caca9dbd654cafb3b4dc0c4882c8927d2eb300d9539dd0b93422800f153650000000000000000"]' \
  --merkle_proof '[]' \
  --tx_index 0 \
  --raw_tx '010000000000000000' \
  --min_confirmations 1

Result:

{
  "block_hash": "72778d2b274a779441240c90f6faba8dfbfe75497393fb4f6c3b6e13821013c6",
  "confirmations": 1,
  "txid": "e5d196bfb21caca9dbd654cafb3b4dc0c4882c8927d2eb300d9539dd0b934228"
}

Verified: txid and block_hash match SHA256d values exactly. ✓

[SUPERSEDED] This deployment predates the current contract build (pre-dates the is_borrow/range-check circuit fixes, the paused flag, and the VerificationResult → SpvVerificationResult rename). Use the “Current deployment” section above instead.

zk-verifier (superseded)

Field	Value
Contract ID	`CDV45GLXG4AOU6BDZSY5YHHVNGQIAYAPD3PUGXIIIYLIO6V2XGO6SMFV`
WASM Hash	`f3943a2b22c9d3e653735736803a1781bdc6802fbb02bf14550e3c1e072c1c77`
WASM Size	11,781 bytes
Deploy tx	`5e9e47a9c4...`
Admin	`GB2BSYQS3FRJ5LZSSIDF3ZCSG5MKWJT5SZ3OZO4QRCAMCR357YAVPTWT` (`writz-deployer`)
Deployed	2026-06-22

Verification keys set

Circuit	IC length	Set tx
Deposit	6	`64488e2acc...`
BorrowRepay	9	`2f7e21ab5b...`
Liquidation	6	`b5d6613498...`

[SUPERSEDED] VKs here are from the pre-range-check circuits - proofs generated by the current circuits/ tree will NOT verify against this instance. Use the “Current deployment” section above.

commitment-tree (superseded)

Field	Value
Contract ID	`CC2OZ3LG5U6RE3U7QC2R5QMID5GHQBE7QXTJQ4ZSTP5W73WDTKQPRW7E`
WASM Hash	`679af82a7441649a69bdba3be88bd8ce1f4d6e9693d96c2e50a6d2196a117e1b`
WASM Size	26,580 bytes
Init tx	`1502ecb851...`
Deployed	2026-06-30
Interface	`deposit`/`borrow`/`repay` carry `enc_note` (sealed recovery note, #18)

Configuration

Parameter	Value
`admin`	`GB2BSYQS3FRJ5LZSSIDF3ZCSG5MKWJT5SZ3OZO4QRCAMCR357YAVPTWT` (`writz-deployer`)
`spv_contract`	`CAE5L7BO2GNF7MIZWXB2BTUMLYNIMQZUSWN2BWLZQS7HRHLOUSL6VLWJ`
`zk_verifier`	`CDV45GLXG4AOU6BDZSY5YHHVNGQIAYAPD3PUGXIIIYLIO6V2XGO6SMFV`
`usdc_token`	`CBIELTK6YBZJU5UP2WWQEUCYKLPU6AUNZ2BQ4WWFEIE3USCIHMXQDAMA` (testnet USDC SAC - `USDC:GBBD47IF…`, DEX-liquid, 7 decimals)
`min_confirmations`	`1` (testnet)
`min_deposit_satoshis`	`10,000` (0.0001 BTC - lowered for signet faucet testing)
`min_collateral_ratio_bp`	`15,000` (150%)
`liquidation_threshold_bp`	`12,000` (120%)

Verified call

stellar contract invoke \
  --id CC2OZ3LG5U6RE3U7QC2R5QMID5GHQBE7QXTJQ4ZSTP5W73WDTKQPRW7E \
  --source writz-deployer \
  --network testnet \
  -- \
  get_merkle_root

Result: "2134e76ac5d21aab186c2be1dd8f84ee880a1e46eaf712f9d371b6df22191f3e" Verified: matches the Poseidon-2 empty Merkle tree root at depth 20. ✓

[SUPERSEDED] Predates paused/setters/supply/withdraw events and the current zk-verifier’s keys. Use the “Current deployment” section above.

private-lend (superseded)

Field	Value
Contract ID	`CCLH2GJYG3QSHZJI7V7VK3DNMNK3I3QJCECBSFGX3AC6CK4I7EF7ZJ2G`
WASM Hash	`43a60a269ecc20e62653513e45a7eb4f585258f112cd7d8fc4a4a3e814407f40`
WASM Size	26,477 bytes
Deploy tx	`4bf1edc3ee...`
Deployed	2026-06-22

[SUPERSEDED] Predates paused/setters/supply/withdraw events and the keeper stale-window liquidation fallback. Use the “Current deployment” section above.

P2WSH End-to-End Test (Bitcoin Signet)

Script: bitcoin-script/scripts/e2e_testnet.mjs
Run: node scripts/e2e_testnet.mjs --dry-run · node scripts/e2e_testnet.mjs (live broadcast)
Date: 2026-06-23
Network: Bitcoin Signet (Blockstream Esplora)

Deposit address

tb1q2ewa3444emmn80sxg9ncfsr9v8pn0cc2ae2fy5u2qqm4a4jewwhsqwjt2m

Key	Value
Protocol pubkey	`031918f1cf7f7c5ce714251bc1c757ea9c855fb11fca316aec6108668379f231ed`
User pubkey	`02bbcf244d0b968684729fc7d82722466048e584907f045d8b8810d7f831655ad7`
CLTV timelock	`700,000` (fixed for test reproducibility; Signet tip ~310k)
User return addr	`tb1qx8kdpw7aj8v2dppxggfw9mm2ckjwvp7mx00325`

Live broadcast results ✓

Field	Value
Funding tx	`61deea44` (89,631 sat to P2WSH)
Release tx	`11932100` (88,131 sat → user)
TX size	347 bytes / 149 vbytes
Fee	1,500 sat (10.1 sat/vbyte)
Witness items	4: `[user_sig (72B), protocol_sig (71B), 0x01, redeemScript (114B)]`

What was verified:

P2WSH address derived correctly from (protocol_key, user_key, CLTV=700,000) ✓
Both keys signed the PSBT independently (multi-party flow) ✓
finalizePathA assembled witness [user_sig, protocol_sig, 0x01, redeemScript] correctly ✓
Transaction broadcast and accepted by Bitcoin Signet mempool ✓

End-to-End ZK Flow Test ✓

Test instance: CDCH7C5TBJOZWIUKVSDGLWPTLTBIC55WH4447ZVIOA4NRDWKOXPVKOHB
Token: XLM native SAC (CDLZFC3SYJYDZT7K67VZ75HPJVIEUVNIXF47ZG2FB2RMQQVU2HHGCYSC)
Date: 2026-06-22

Step	Transaction
initialize	`b6527209c4...`
supply_usdc (500 XLM)	`d340e51655...`
deposit (ZK proof ✓)	`ae3c8eeba4...`
insert_commitment	`32d263a550...`
borrow 200 XLM (ZK proof ✓)	`046a116582...`
repay 200 XLM (ZK proof ✓)	`11c94e34d8...`

What was verified on-chain:

Groth16 deposit proof: BN254 pairing check via bn254.pairing_check host function ✓
Commitment inserted into Poseidon Merkle tree (root updated) ✓
Groth16 borrow proof: collateral ratio enforced by ZK circuit (150% min) ✓
USDC (XLM) transferred from pool to borrower ✓
Groth16 repay proof: field-negation repay amount recovered correctly ✓
Pool accounting updated after each operation ✓
All proofs verified against zk-verifier contract CDV45GLXG4AOU6BDZSY5YHHVNGQIAYAPD3PUGXIIIYLIO6V2XGO6SMFV ✓

Re-run after the `enc_note` interface change (#18)

The 2026-06-22 run above predates enc_note. e2e_zkflow.js was not updated alongside the contract, so it failed at the deposit step until fixed (#15). Re-verified against the current interface: Test instance: CBM5OUBYBICB3QB4T5PAGYUWWLZOIVWQCUHKV3HCSNZGB72GYM5Q5ID4 Token: XLM native SAC (CDLZFC3SYJYDZT7K67VZ75HPJVIEUVNIXF47ZG2FB2RMQQVU2HHGCYSC) Date: 2026-07-30 · whole run completes in about a minute

Step	Transaction
initialize	`aed32de63b…`
supply_usdc (500 XLM)	`512b91d750…`
deposit (ZK proof ✓)	`c3320d79f9…`
insert_commitment	`9fbed23db3…`
borrow 200 XLM (ZK proof ✓)	`b7b83f7501…`
repay 200 XLM (ZK proof ✓)	`261d8b14ab…`

Reproduction steps, build prerequisites, and the trusted-setup caveat: docs/developers/runbook.md.

Architecture

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Products

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Testnet

Writz Protocol - Testnet Deployments

Current deployment (2026-08-19)

bitcoin-spv

zk-verifier

commitment-tree

Configuration

private-lend

Configuration

End-to-End ZK Flow Test ✓ (2026-08-19, against the current deployment)

Follow-ups this redeploy did not do

Superseded deployment (2026-06-22 / 2026-06-30)

bitcoin-spv

Verified call

zk-verifier (superseded)

Verification keys set

commitment-tree (superseded)

Configuration

Verified call

private-lend (superseded)

P2WSH End-to-End Test (Bitcoin Signet)

Deposit address

Live broadcast results ✓

End-to-End ZK Flow Test ✓

Re-run after the `enc_note` interface change (#18)

​Writz Protocol - Testnet Deployments

​Current deployment (2026-08-19)

​bitcoin-spv

​zk-verifier

​commitment-tree

​Configuration

​private-lend

​Configuration

​End-to-End ZK Flow Test ✓ (2026-08-19, against the current deployment)

​Follow-ups this redeploy did not do

​Superseded deployment (2026-06-22 / 2026-06-30)

​bitcoin-spv

​Verified call

​zk-verifier (superseded)

​Verification keys set

​commitment-tree (superseded)

​Configuration

​Verified call

​private-lend (superseded)

​P2WSH End-to-End Test (Bitcoin Signet)

​Deposit address

​Live broadcast results ✓

​End-to-End ZK Flow Test ✓

​Re-run after the enc_note interface change (#18)

Writz Protocol - Testnet Deployments

Current deployment (2026-08-19)

bitcoin-spv

zk-verifier

commitment-tree

Configuration

private-lend

Configuration

End-to-End ZK Flow Test ✓ (2026-08-19, against the current deployment)

Follow-ups this redeploy did not do

Superseded deployment (2026-06-22 / 2026-06-30)

bitcoin-spv

Verified call

zk-verifier (superseded)

Verification keys set

commitment-tree (superseded)

Configuration

Verified call

private-lend (superseded)

P2WSH End-to-End Test (Bitcoin Signet)

Deposit address

Live broadcast results ✓

End-to-End ZK Flow Test ✓

Re-run after the `enc_note` interface change (#18)